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3ABSTRACT
The economist’s conceptualisation of inequality in terms of
interpersonal distribution of income or wealth, and the tradition of
measurement of inequality that follows from this conceptualisation have
not paid adequate attention to the need for reckoning inequality across
social groups. In this paper we show that certain simple statistical tools
to analyse categorical data can be shown to have properties that conform
to our normative judgement on group inequality. We then analyse the
grouped data available from such sources as the NSSO to illuminate our
understanding of group inequality in India. A broader goal of this paper
is to combine the insights from the literature on axiomatic method of
measuring inequality with the idea of inequality that is commonly shared
by other social science disciplines like sociology and political science.
JEL Classification:  I31
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41.  Introduction
The core of the economist’s approach to measurement of inequality
consists of a formal structure that is founded on a set of axioms and
mathematical propositions. This forms a natural extension to the literature
on social choice and welfare economics in which the prevailing practice
is to derive conclusions by strict logical deduction from first principles.
The formal structure has close connections with those dealing with some
other related issues in economics as well, such as, the issues in index
number construction, the measurement of risk, and so on.
The research agenda on the axiomatic foundation of inequality
measures can be seen as a clear departure from the way classical political
economy approached the issue of inequality. In classical political
economy of Marx or Ricardo the emphasis was on setting the analysis
of economic injustice within a particular social or institutional framework.
The focus of research in more recent times, however, has been on the
‘foundational issues’ which are considered to be invariant across social
and institutional settings. Nearly all of the theoretical propositions and
indexes put forward in this literature have been founded on a small set
of core assumptions, such as scale independence (or translation
independence), the principle of transfer, and the population principle.
Until a few years ago, all that was said about these axioms was that they
were ‘reasonable’. In recent years, inequality research has taken an
5interesting turn. A substantial literature based on the ‘experimental
evidence’ has come up which examines whether the standard axiomatic
structure coincides with public perceptions of inequality. (Amiel and
Cowell, 1999).
Sociologists, for good reason, have not had much sympathy for
the economist’s preoccupation with foundational principles and axioms.
They have long recognised that perceptions of inequality are related to
how an individual is socially situated. They chose to focus instead on
the process of inequality – how inequality persists over time - much in
the tradition of the classical political economy. One might even argue
that the entire history of sociological thought could be written in terms
of attempts to answer questions like ‘why is there inequality in societies?’
The ‘theories of inequality’ that seek to address these questions, however,
have generally remained separate from the technical issues in
measurement. A theorist of inequality rarely makes an attempt to develop
a measure of inequality and examine its theoretical properties. Even when
she is compelled to use some inequality measure to analyse data, she
makes her choice as a matter of habit or convenience, and makes no
effort to examine the axiomatic foundation of her chosen index1 .
From what we have just said it would be wrong to conclude that
there is a complete division of labour between the two groups so that
sociology is the only discipline that has supplied all theories of inequality
and all indexes of inequality are economists’ contributions. Explaining
1 Very recently, the editors of the Journal of the Indian School of Political Economy
have done a remarkable job in bringing out a special issue of the journal on the
Scheduled Castes (JISPE, July – December, 2000). Since the articles are written
almost exclusively from the sociologist’s perspective (and the Guest Editor is
Professor Andre Beteille, a renowned sociologist), there is no discussion on the
measurement issues, even though the reader must be amazed by the painstaking
work that has gone into the impressive statistical supplement.
6(apart from measuring) the persistence or change in inequality is as much
the economist’s research problem as the sociologist’s. As a matter of
fact, this is an area where more frequently one sees cross-fertilization of
ideas. This is evident from the recent theoretical work by economists
that aims at analysing group inequality (Loury, 1981; Akerlof, 1997).
But interestingly, even though sociology and other disciplines like
political science and geography have their own share in the
methodological literature in inequality measurement, there is no strong
evidence of cross-disciplinary interaction of ideas on measurement. Very
few sociologists have so far chosen to intervene in the axiomatic literature
on measurement of income inequality. Even though there has been a
growing interest among a small group of economists in measures of
segregation or stratification, which had originally been introduced by
sociologists, an overwhelming majority of economists are largely
preoccupied with interpersonal distribution of income2 . Even when it is
argued that income is not the right kind of ‘space’ in which the question
of distributive justice should be dealt with, the reference unit in
economists’ thinking continues to be the individual. This is clearly evident
from some of the recent attempts to measure inequality in the space of
what Amartya Sen calls ‘human functionings’3 .
To add a further dimension to what we have already said, political
scientists too have noted the connection between the rise of modern
democracy and the conceptualisation of the social world based on
individual selves as the fundamental units for the calculation of social
welfare. The collective identity in the modern democracy is supposed to
2 One of the most authoritative collections of articles on poverty and inequality in
India is Krishnaswamy (1990) which contains no reference to inequality among
groups.
3 See Hicks (1997) for an important attempt in this direction.
7form around common interests. And therefore condensation of individuals
into groups is never permanent in a modern democracy. In India, however,
perception of disadvantage often tends to be more collective than
individual, and collectivity is seen as solidarities that are not interest-
based. “Disadvantage is seen more as unjust treatment of whole
communities, like lower castes, minority religious groups and tribal
communities, which are thus seen as potential political actors for social
equality….Certainly, people who are part of democratic mobilisations
are predominantly poor, but the principle of their self-identifying action
is not poverty but discrimination” (Kaviraj, 1996).
The point that we want to emphasise here is that, even though
economists have been somewhat influenced by other disciplines while
approaching the conceptualisation of well-being and explaining its
distribution among people, on the question of measurement they have
remained more or less insulated from others. In applied research,
calculating the Gini index of interpersonal distribution of income
continues to be the economist’s favourite4 . Would our understanding of
inequality measurement be enriched if we could draw liberally on
disciplinary approaches other than economics? This paper is motivated
by the belief that it would 5 . The main objective of this paper is to critically
reflect on the economist’s conceptualisation of inequality and the tradition
of measurement of inequality that follows from this conceptualisation.
4 It would be wrong if we said economists completely ignored group inequality.
The literature on ‘inequality decomposition’ addresses the question by
decomposing the overall inequality index into the intergroup and intragroup
components. See Anand (1983) for an excellent application of this method.
5 Some attempts were indeed made in the past toward this objective. Beteille (1983)
did an excellent job in bringing together a group of five scholars in various
disciplines with the aim of ‘the cross-fertilization of scholarly discourse’.
8The other important objective is to illuminate the issue of group inequality
in the Indian context using appropriate technical tools.
In the next section we discuss the methodological implications of
the habit of thinking exclusively in terms of interpersonal distribution of
income. In section three, we discuss various ways of measuring group
inequality and why we choose to apply some simple statistical tools to
illustrate certain aspects of group inequality. In section four we discuss
our results.  We conclude in section five.
2.  Interpersonal and intergroup inequality
Beteille (1983) made a useful distinction between two aspects of
inequality – the relational and the distributional aspects. The sociologist
is mostly concerned with the first kind, whereas the economist is with
the second. In the first case, inequalities are seen as built into the social
structure in the form of relations of superordination and subordination,
i.e. the patterns of rights and obligations. The economist, on the other
hand, sees inequality in the distribution of wealth or income, or, following
Sen, in the distribution of certain ‘outcome indicator’ like health or
educational status. Why has the economist been rather less concerned
about inequality across racial, ethnic or caste groups? The answer
probably lies in the methodological preference of the economist for a
depersonalised agent as the unit of analysis. The agent acts independently
to choose the best course of action given the opportunities. This way of
thinking has definitely been fruitful in illuminating a variety of problems.
It cannot, however, fully capture the ways intergroup inequality persists
over time. There is no point in denying that one’s location within the
network of social affiliations substantially affects one’s access to
resources.
At some point in the past, even some sociologists – mainly of the
Parsonian persuasion – assumed that inequalities of race, gender and
9even class background were all forms of ascription that would go away
with the development of impersonal market forces. They shared the same
belief in the rationalising logic of modernity as the development
economists of the earlier generation, even though they differed
significantly on whether the market or the central planner would be the
agent of modernity. The subsequent rise of neo-Marxian scholarship
restored class analysis to a central position. It was then assumed that
class-based loyalties were in the end fundamental. In recent decades,
however, the discipline of sociology has turned full circle. The class-
centred approach has been giving way to new multidimensional accounts
of identity that include caste, religion and gender categories.
One would naturally expect that this development would influence
the way the economist measures inequality. While attempts have been
made by UNDP’s team of experts to develop group-inequality-adjusted
indices such as the Gender-related Development Index, reckoning
inequality among social groups has not drawn as much attention.
In recent years, UNDP has succeeded in persuading a large number
of national and sub-national governments to produce their own Human
Development Reports. Two Indian states, Madhya Pradesh and
Karnataka, have already done it, and others are expected to follow suit.
With this a small craft industry has developed in computing the human
development index at sub national levels. The objective ostensibly is to
capture disparities in the levels of achievement within the country and
the sub-national units. In India, the obvious sub-national units are the
states. And a case for ranking the states according to their levels of human
development can surely be made on the ground of planning and
evaluation. But can one apply the same logic while computing human
development index for districts and ranking them according to their index
values? I shall argue that there are reasons to be skeptical about the real
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worth of this exercise, and the state human development reports could
do a better job if they highlighted some aspects of intergroup inequality6 .
There are at least two different kinds of motivation behind most of
our attempts to compile data on various indicators of development at the
national and sub-national levels, and the two have distinct methodological
and empirical consequences. International institutions such as UNDP or
the World Bank routinely publish compilations of a variety of indicators,
the most important purpose of which is clearly planning and evaluation.
Governments, international agencies and foundations have a constant
need for estimating various aspects of the development process to inform
resource allocation decisions and formulate appropriate development
programmes. On the other hand, the task for development research is to
develop theories and methods to illuminate our understanding of social
phenomena. Even though both from planning and evaluation point of
view as well as from social research and analysis point of view we need
to identify a variety of quantifiable aspects of the phenomenon called
‘development’, a common set of indicators and indices may not be
suitable for both the purposes. This seemingly banal observation is often
overlooked in practice.
When we make an attempt to measure the status of human
development at the district level, what we are up to is capturing variation
or inequality within the state. As we have argued, at the conceptual level
inequality refers to achievement variation among people or between
groups of people. The geographical or administrative units such as the
districts is brought into the analysis of inequality on the assumption that
groups of people are delimited in such a way that people will be able to
6 Neither The Madhya Pradesh Human Development Report 1998 nor Human
Development in Karnataka 1999 has any discussion on inequality across social
groups.
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identify themselves as belonging to this or that district.  This does not
seem to be a very reasonable assumption. While it is true that the locality
one belongs to may form one of the dimensions in one’s identity, it is not
clear whether the district is the relevant unit. It would perhaps be more
reasonable to treat inequality as the variation among socio-demographic
groups rather than over the administrative units.  In this context, the two
different purposes that we distinguished above may be recalled. Even
though from planning or resource allocation point of view, focus on
districts can be justified, it serves very little purpose when it comes to
social research.  To tie the description of inequality or variation in
achievements to a recognised social structure will make the description
more pertinent to the political discussion. Rural-urban disparity, gender
disparity, or disparity between scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes
(ST) and non SC/STs are examples of more meaningful groupings from
analytical point of view.  The need for inter-district analysis, however,
cannot be ignored either. Such analysis is necessary to address the issue
of spatial variation in development outcomes, which in turn is a valuable
input to resource allocation decisions by the government. What we are
questioning is the tendency to give overwhelming importance to planning
or administrative purposes while dealing with social data.
Unlike income, HDI is not measured at an individual level. This
has been considered by many (predominantly economists) as a serious
limitation, since it is generally believed that one is basically interested
to know how the benefits of human development achievement are
distributed among individuals. To discuss the implications of this kind
of belief it would be helpful if we made a distinction between two kinds
of indicators. Some aspects of development refer to some property of a
human collectivity, other than those simply derived from information
on the conditions of individuals constituting the collectivity.  Such an
aspect, which may be called a ‘system’ aspect, is typically formed both
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by individuals and the social relations linking them together. Obvious
cases of system aspects are those concerning the nature and operation of
the political system of the collectivity. Some aspects, on the other hand,
concern those features that can be documented by summing data about
its individual members. We can call them ‘aggregable’ aspects7 . Many
aggregable dimensions are simple totals or averages or rates.
In the light of this distinction it can be argued that an indicator
need not always be definable at an individual level. And we further add
that taking care of distributional concerns does not necessarily require
individual level and aggregable variables. Furthermore, the study of
inequality in non-distributable conditions – such as health or knowledge
and skills, of which it is not possible to transfer units between persons -
becomes more meaningful when we study inequality between groups
rather than between individuals. To study the distribution of physical
disabilities, for example, over the population at large has very little
importance. From social scientific point of view, it would be more
meaningful if we could show that physical disability on average and net
of age differences varies between social classes.
3.   Measures of group inequality
In this section we make an attempt to measure the disparity among
the three groups – the Scheduled Tribes, the Scheduled Castes, and others
– in terms of the incidence of poverty. The extent of poverty in a group
has been loosely measured here as the percentage of people belonging
to the group whose monthly per capita consumption expenditure does
not exceed Rs. 190. The choice of Rs 190 may be justified by the fact
that it is the 30th percentile of the all-India rural MPCE distribution.
7 The idea of this distinction has been borrowed from Miles (1985).
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Table 1 gives such percentages for 17 major states in India on the basis
of the data from the 5th quinquennial survey of consumption expenditure
(NSS 50th Round, 1993-94) conducted by the National Sample Survey
Organisation (NSSO) and reported in NSSO (1997).
Table 1. Percentage of persons with MPCE less than Rs 190 for
different social groups
STATES ST SC Others All
Andhra Pradesh 40.5 42.3 23.1 28.4
Assam 12.8 18.0 22.2 20.5
Bihar 60.3 60.3 41.2 47.0
Gujarat 25.9 27.6 13.2 17.8
Haryana 41.5 23.1 7.4 12.4
Himachal Pradesh 28.6 18.0 8.9 11.9
Jammu & Kashmir 40.3 6.2 6.4 7.0
Karnataka 39.5 48.8 25.4 31.5
Kerala 24.2 17.6 9.5 10.5
Madhya Pradesh 55.3 44.2 28.8 39.3
Maharashtra 47.9 49.7 30.8 36.1
Orissa 69.6 46.7 38.1 47.6
Punjab 22.0 7.9 1.7 4.4
Rajasthan 30.8 25.5 10.3 16.5
Tamil Nadu 41.7 41.1 25.2 29.6
Uttar Pradesh 30.8 48.8 27.6 32.7
West Bengal 37.5 28.1 21.6 25.0
All-India 44.1 40.3 24.7 30.2
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From the four columns of Table 1 one can certainly make a few
straightforward observations on particular states. But if one wishes to
throw more light on the overall pattern of group inequality and the relative
position of each state in that respect, one has to go beyond Table 1.
One of the most popular measures of group inequality that many
applied researchers have used takes the following simple form:
If there are two identifiable groups of people, A and B, and if XA
and XB, respectively, are the average levels of certain indicator for the
two groups, then the group inequality index (GI):
 XA
 GI  = ____  (1)
  
XB
Kishor (1993), instead, used
GI  =    log XA –  log XB  (2)
An altogether different alternative could be
   GI  =    XB - 
  
XA  (3)
      Or,
      XB –  XAGI  =   ______  (4)
       XA
The basic difference between (3) and the first two is that, while
(1) and (2) are invariant with respect to equiproportionate changes in XA
and XB, (3) remains unchanged if a constant is added to XA and XB.
These two properties are similar to the well-known axioms of scale
independence and translation independence in the inequality literature.
The value judgement implicit in the axiom of scale independence is that
inequality should be invariant to equiproportional changes in incomes
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of all individuals. The value judgement in the axiom of translation
independence is that inequality should not be affected by equal additions
to incomes of all individuals. In our case we have two groups rather than
n individuals. If we ignore intragroup inequality then the arguments are
similar. Since the measures based on scale independence produce index
values which are, in a sense, more ‘conservative’ than those based on
translation independence, the former type of measures are called ‘rightist’
and the latter ‘leftist’ (Kolm, 1976). The choice between the two is clearly
a matter of value judgement. We formally state the two axioms with
slight changes so as to make them meaningful in the context of group
inequality.
Let Xi be an indicator of achievement by the ith group, i = A, B,
and x be the pair (XA, XB).  Let S be the set of all possible pairs x. By an
inequality comparison we mean a binary relation on the members of S.
Given any x, x′ ε S, x ≈ x' means the degree of inequality between the
groups is the same in x and x'.
Scale Independence:  For any  x ε S, and any positive scalar λ such that
λx ε S, λx ≈ x.
Translation Independence:   For any x ε S and any scalar α such that
x + αI ε S (I denotes a vector of ones), x + αI  ≈  x.
Notice that (1), (2) and (4) satisfy scale independence, and (3) satisfies
translation independence.
Many of the studies done by the National Council of Applied
Economic Research (NCAER) on Human Development across states
have applied (1) as the ‘disparity index’.  In a recent study, applying (1)
on the data from past four censuses, two NCAER researchers have
concluded that the overall disparity in the rates of literacy between SCs
and others has declined over the past decades (Chakrabarty and Ghosh,
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2000). It is not difficult to see that the conclusion becomes a great deal
weaker if one uses (3) rather than (1).
The Human Development Report 1995 took a more sophisticated
approach to reckon inequality between gender groups. The Gender-related
Development Index (GDI) is an adjusted version of the Human
Development Index (HDI), and the adjusted formula has been based on
the idea of the ‘equally distributed equivalent achievement’ in line with
the approach Atkinson (1970) put forward in his classic paper. This falls
in the group of indices of inequality that are based on the concept of the
‘social welfare function’. The social welfare function that GDI assumes
is the same as the one Atkinson introduced 8 . If one is interested in ranking
the Indian states according to a combined index of aggregate achievement
and inequality in achievement across various groups, the GDI
methodology can be useful9 .
 We do not attempt to develop an alternative index based on the
social welfare function approach. After all a social welfare function is
no less arbitrary than any so-called ‘ad-hoc’10  index formula. We examine
instead the adequacy of the statistical measures such as the odds ratio,
which are well-known to an applied researcher in social sciences, in the
light of the axioms that are known only to the researcher in the axiomatic
measures of inequality. We find that the odds ratio does possess the
properties that might be considered ‘desirable’ from the vantage point of
the axiomatic method.
8 For the derivation of the index formula and the assumptions behind it, see Anand
and Sen (1995).
9 There have been several other attempts to develop indexes of group inequality in
recent years. See, for example, Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999).
10 It is generally the practice within the axiomatic literature that if an index formula
is not founded on axiomatic basis it is called ‘ad-hoc’.
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What does an odds ratio measure? The standard statistical
procedure for categorical data essentially addresses two distinct aspects:
homogeneity and association. Homogeneity refers to the hypothesis that
the probability of ‘being poor’ is the same in the two groups being
compared. The odds ratio is used to capture the relative degree of
departure from homogeneity. If p1 is the probability that a person
belonging to the Scheduled Caste is poor and p2 the probability that a
non-SC person is poor then the odds ratio ‘in favour of’ poverty with
respect to SC or others is given by
One of the interesting things about the odds ratio is that if p1 and
p2 increase by the same proportion the odds ratio increases. Let us explain
in terms of an example what it means. Consider two states S and T. In S,
20 percent of the people belonging to SC and 10 percent of ‘others’ are
poor, whereas in T the percentages are 40 and 20 respectively. If our
inequality measure satisfied the scale independence axiom, the intergroup
inequality in S and T would be the same. But can we hope to reach an
agreement on the desirability of scale independence in this context (that
is, in the context of intergroup inequality)? One would rather like to
judge that intergroup disparity is more in T than in S. The odds ratio
captures this intuition.
What would be our judgement if the percentages in T were 50 and
40 instead of 40 and 20, whereas the percentages in S were the same as
above (i.e. 20 and 10)? Notice that the difference between the two
percentages in T is the same as in S. One would probably perceive less
intergroup inequality in T than in S for the simple reason that in T the
  p1
    
  
O
SC /others, poor  =
1 – p1
   p2
1 – p2
18
overall incidence of poverty is much higher. If we accept this intuitive
idea as well, then the odds ratio passes the test (see Appendix for proof).
Notice that while (3) too has this second property, scale independence
makes it unattractive. We can now summarise our discussion as Table 2.
It needs to be mentioned that the odds ratio as an index of group
inequality is not strictly comparable with the first three. While p1 and p2
are expressed only as percentages, XA and XB can be indicators like the
life expectancy at birth which are expressed in certain units. However,
for practical purposes this may not be a serious problem since an indicator
like the ‘percentage of people who are likely to die before reaching age
forty’ may be used to reckon inequality in the dimension of longevity.
One reason for our preference for the statistical measures is that
even before we get to measure inequality between the social groups we
need to examine if poverty frequency and social group identity are related.
This is addressed by the measures of association. As we have mentioned,
the study is entirely based on the classified data published in NSSO
(1997). First, we regrouped the per capita monthly expenditure classes
into two – one containing all MPCE levels less than Rs 190 and the
Table 2.
 Equiproportionate change Equal addition
XA/XB No change (ND) Decreases (D)
Log XA – log XB No change (ND) Decreases (D)
XB - XA Increases (D) No change (ND)
(XB – XA)/XA No change (ND) Decreases (D)
Odds Ratio Increases (D) Decreases (D)
D: Desirable ND: Not desirable
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other exceeding Rs. 190. The first group can loosely be called the ‘poor’
and the second ‘non-poor’. Thus, for each state, we get a 3x2 contingency
table (3 rows for the categories of ST, SC and others, and 2 columns for
‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’) with the cell frequencies calculated from the ‘per
thousand’ figures and the estimated population totals.
From the definition of independence, existence of association
between poverty and social group identity means that the probabilities
of the joint events in the cells can be written in terms of the marginal
probabilities. An appropriate test statistic for this will be the contingency
chi-square statistic with (3-1)(2-1) degrees of freedom. From the same
data set, we have constructed another contingency table with five rows
and two conlumns, where rows are for five categories of occupational
groups in rural areas: self-employed in non-agriculture, agricultural
labour, other labour, self-employed in agriculture, and other households.
The idea here is to see whether the possibility of interest-based grouping
is stronger than the community-based grouping. If there is a strong
association between the economic status and the caste identity the
perception of relative disadvantage is likely to be reinforced by the
economic deprivation. This is just to mention one dimension of many-
sided implications of differing degrees of association.
To see the relative strength of the two kinds of association we
have used Cramer’s V measure which seems to be the most useful for
comparing several tables of different dimensions11 . Unlike the odds ratios,
however, this measure of association cannot be given any substantive
meaning. We have used it as an index number to compare the degrees of
association between poverty and social group identity on one side and
between poverty and occupational groups on the other.
11 See Mukherjee, White and Wuyts (1998) for a lucid discussion on this.
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We feel that the simple statistical tools for analysing categorical
data can thus serve the twin purpose of highlighting the relative positions
of different states in terms of intergroup differencs in relative
disadvantage, as well as the degree of association between the levels of
living and alternative groupings (in terms of occupations, in our case).
 4.  Discussion of results
In Table 3 the two columns of Cramer’s V - one indicating the
degree of association between poverty and social groups and the other
Table  3
   
 STATES  Cramer’s V       Cramer’s V   Difference
 Pov&Soc.Gr.    Pov&Occ.Gr.
     (1)       (2)          (3)     (3) – (2)
Andhra Pradesh 0.187 0.200 0.013
Assam 0.083 0.315 0.232
Bihar 0.175 0.317 0.142
Gujarat 0.166 0.231 0.065
Haryana 0.251 0.398 0.147
Himachal Pradesh 0.162 0.181 0.019
Jammu & Kashmir 0.188 0.167 -0.021
Karnataka 0.207 0.282 0.075
Kerala 0.096 0.200 0.104
Madhya Pradesh 0.241 0.270 0.029
Maharashtra 0.172 0.291 0.119
Orissa 0.263 0.276 0.013
Punjab 0.185 0.226 0.041
Rajasthan 0.231 0.238 0.007
Tamil Nadu 0.156 0.285 0.129
Uttar Pradesh 0.193 0.229 0.036
West Bengal 0.110 0.333 0.223
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Table 4
STATES MPCE<190 Odds ratio Odds ratio Rank Rank Overall
All ST/Others SC/Others ST/Others SC/Others GI rank
Andhra Pradesh 28.4 2.266 2.440 8 11 12
Assam 20.5 0.515 0.769 1 1 1
Bihar 47.0 2.168 2.168 6 8 5
Gujarat 17.8 2.298 2.506 9 12 13
Haryana 12.4 8.879 3.760 15 16 16
Himachal Pradesh 11.9 4.100 2.247 14 10 14
Jammu & Kashmir 7.0 9.869 0.966 16 2 11
Karnataka 31.5 1.917 2.799 3 13 7
Kerala 10.5 3.041 2.034 10 6 7
Madhya Pradesh 39.3 3.058 1.958 11 5 7
Maharashtra 36.1 2.066 2.220 4 9 4
Orissa 47.6 3.720 1.424 12 4 7
Punjab 4.4 16.300 4.958 17 17 17
Rajasthan 16.5 3.877 2.982 13 14 15
Tamil Nadu 29.6 2.123 2.071 5 7 3
Uttar Pradesh 32.7 1.168 2.500 2 12 5
West Bengal 25.0 2.178 1.419 7 3 2
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between poverty and occupational groups  - reveal an important fact
about the nature of association in the Indian context.
The values of the contingency chi-square statistic have not been
reported since all of them are far above the critical values. The degree of
association between poverty and occupational groups is definitely
stronger than the other kind of association in all the states except Jammu
and Kashmir. The difference between the two, however, varies across
the states. The degree of association between poverty and social group
identity is relatively weak in Kerala, West Bengal and Assam. And Tamil
Nadu comes next. The association is high in Orissa, Haryana, Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan.
The second and third columns of odds ratios in Table 4 have more
direct interpretation. The relative disadvantage that the two groups - SC
and ST – experience vis-à-vis others again varies quite a bit across the
states. Even within a state the difference between SC and ST can be
large. This is clear from the fourth and fifth columns in Table 4 which
give the ranking of states according to the index of group inequality
between SC and others and between ST and others, respectively. For
example, whereas in Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka the scheduled tribe
populations are much less disadvantaged compared to the scheduled
castes, in Jammu & Kashmir and Orissa a reverse scenario is apparent.
Assam has the distinction of having the lowest degree of inequality and
Punjab has the highest on both counts. We are, however, not sure how
much importance should be given to our finding on the scheduled tribe
population in Punjab and Haryana. Although in general it is not a major
problem that the numbers of SC and ST in different states estimated
from NSS differ to some extent from the Census (1991) figures, for
Punjab and Haryana the problem is different. According to the Census,
‘no population has been scheduled as tribe’ in Punjab and Haryana, but
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if one goes by NSSO (1997) one does ‘find’ scheduled tribe population
in these states. To avoid confusion we present in Table 5 the percentages
of SC and ST population across states according to both Census, 1991,
and NSS 50th Round, 1993-94.
In Punjab the odds ratio ‘in favour of poverty’ with respect to the
scheduled tribe population vis-à-vis others is roughly sixteen, and that
with respect to the scheduled caste population vis-à-vis others is around
Table 5
STATES %ST %ST %SC %SC
NSS Census NSS Census
Andhra Pradesh 7.57 6.31 16.51 15.93
Assam 13.20 12.83 9.13 7.40
Bihar 8.03 7.66 20.72 14.56
Gujarat 16.62 14.92 11.78 7.41
Haryana 1.86 0.00 24.37 19.75
Himachal Pradesh 4.13 4.22 23.38 25.34
Jammu & Kashmir 1.90 NA 27.40 NA
Karnataka 7.50 4.26 18.05 16.38
Kerala 1.29 1.10 9.02 9.92
Madhya Pradesh 24.14 23.27 17.56 14.54
Maharashtra 11.66 9.27 18.54 11.10
Orissa 23.45 22.21 17.83 16.20
Punjab 1.46 0.00 33.17 28.31
Rajasthan 13.23 12.44 17.74 17.29
Tamil Nadu 1.80 1.03 21.61 19.18
Uttar Pradesh 0.89 0.21 21.98 21.04
West Bengal 6.70 5.60 28.54 23.62
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five – both are rather high. How should we reconcile this with the fact
that the overall incidence of poverty in Punjab is the lowest among all
Indian states? In general it seems to be the case that in states with low
overall incidence of poverty the gap between the SC-ST population and
others is relatively more pronounced. This is clearly evident if we take a
look at the odds ratios together with the first column of Table 4. The
three states, Punjab, Haryana and Jammu and Kashmir, which have the
lowest percentage of people below MPCE  Rs.190, have the highest
degree of disparity between social groups (as revealed by the odds ratios).
5.  Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a way of looking at the issue of
measuring inequality across social groups. We have illustrated that the
simple statistical tools to analyse categorical data can be applied to
grouped data available from such sources as the NSSO reports to
illuminate our understanding of inequality between the social groups in
India. A greater portion of the paper has been devoted to conceptual
clarification of the notion of group inequality, drawing lessons from other
social science disciplines besides economics. We have argued that the
economist’s preoccupation with interpersonal distribution of income has
been responsible for the lack of development in measures of group
inequality.
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Appendix
It is easy to show that
I. For all 0>λ > 1 and p1 > p2
λ p1(1 – λp2)  p1 (1 – p2)
λ p2(1 – λp1) p1 (1 – p1)
Proof:
λ p1(1 – λp2)  p1(1 – p2)
                 Assume λ p2(1 – λp1)  p2 (1 – p1)
1–λp2     1–p2
<=> [since  λ, p
1
, p
2
 > 0]
1–λp1      1–p1
<=> 1- λp2 – p1 + λp1p2 < 1-λp1 - p2 +  λp1 p2
<=> λ (p1 – p2) < (p1 – p2)
<=> λ< 1   if p1 > p2 which contradicts our initial
assumption.
In other words, disparity increases if both p1 and p2 increase
equiproportionately.
II.
p1 (1 – p2)
For all d, 0< d<1–p1 –p2  and      > 1p2 (1 – p1)
(p1 + d) (1–p2–d) p1(1 – p2)
(p2 + d) (1–p1–d) p2(1 – p1)
>
<
<
<
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Proof:
(p1 + d) (1–p2–d) p1(1–p2)
                   Assume
(p2 + d) (1–p1–d) p2(1–p1)
p1 (1–p2) +d(1–p1–p2–d) p1(1–p2)
<=>
p2(1–p1) + d (1-p1–p1–d) p2 (1–p1)
d (1–p1–p2–d) d(1–p1–p2–d)
<=>
      p1(1–p2)    p2 (1–p1)
 p1(1–p2)
<=> <  1 assuming 0 <  d < 1–p1–p2
 p2(1–p1)
This contradicts our initial assumption.
In other words, disparity decreases if p1 and p2  increase by adding
a constant.
>
>
>
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